Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Roland W. Reichert : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1990
Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Roland W. Reichert :
Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Bryce E. Roe; Fabian and Clendenin; Attorneys for Respondent.
Ephraim H. Fankhauser, David D. Peck; Attorneys for Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, No. 90029.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/2798
"»rMM"*>; 
L? i - r . 
.- UUURT 
...* 
^ 
bRIE£ 
1 iINTHE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
NO,. fLiPj 
REGIONAL SALES AGENCY, 
INC., 
Appellant, 
v. 
ROLAND W. REICHERT, 
Respondent. 
Supplemental Brief of Appellant 
Roland W. Reichert 
Case No. 90029 
EPHRAIM H. FANKHAUSER 
DAVID D. PECK 
243 East 400 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
(801)534-1148 
Attorneys for Appellant Mr. Reichert 
BRYCE E. ROE 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
215 South State Street 12th Floor 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Attorneys for Respondent Regional Sales Agency, Inc. 
«-*»*•*« "^ Lj2? 
MAR 1 1991 
Clerk, Supreme Court, Utah 
Roland W. Reichert, Appellant in this Court, submits the following 
Supplemental Brief by and through counsel of record pursuant to the 
Court's Notice of Supplemental Briefing dated February 5, 1991. 
ISSUE ON APPEAL 
Should Judge Judith M. Billings have recused 
herself in the instant case at the Utah Court of 
Appeals level? If so, upon what grounds? 
FACTS 
1. Bryce Roe, counsel for Respondent Regional Sales, became 
formally associated with the firm of Fabian & Clendenin during the course 
of this action at the trial level. 
2. Although counsel for Mr. Reichert did know that this change 
in the association of Mr. Roe with Fabian & Clendenin had taken place, 
Mr. Fankhauser was unaware of the membership of that firm in detail until 
about April 6, 1990. 
3. At or about that time Mr. Fankhauser noted that letterhead 
from that firm revealed that said firm had two members named Billings, to 
wit Peter W. Billings Sr. and Peter W. Billings, Jr. 
4. The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals had been written 
and spearheaded by Judge Judith W. Billings. 
5. Upon further investigation of the relationship, if any, between 
the attorneys Billings and Judge Billings, Mr. Fankhauser learned that they 
are related within the third degree of affinity. 
6. At oral argument held before this court, Justice Durham 
revealed the fact that Judge Billings regularly disqualifies herself in 
proceedings involving a firm with which a lawyer-relative is affiliated. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution Requires the Presence of a Fair and 
Impartial Tribunal as an Element of Due Process. 
As a prelude to consideration of the issue presented by the court for 
review, Appellant turns the court's attention to the statements of the United 
States Supreme Court. That court stated: 
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic 
requirement of due process.. Fairness of course 
requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of 
cases. But our system of law had always 
endeavored to prevent even the probability of 
unfairness. To this end no man can be a judge in 
his own case and no man is permitted to try cases 
where he has an interest in the outcome. That 
interest cannot be defined with precision. 
Circumstances and relationships must be 
considered. This Court has said, however, that 
"Every procedure which would offer a possible 
temptation to the average man as a judge * * * not 
to hold the balance nice, clear, and true between 
the State and the accused denies the latter due 
process of law." [citations omitted] Such a 
stringent rule may sometimes bar trial by judges 
who have no actual bias and who would do their 
very best to weigh the scales of justice equally 
between contending parties. But to perform its 
high function in the best way "justice must satisfy 
the appearance of justice." 
In Re Murchison. 75 S.Ct. 623, at 625, emphasis added. This opinion 
stresses the fact that considerations regarding disqualification should not be 
made only by resort to hard and fast "bright line" rules alone. The very 
spirit of due process envisions a fairness that is as important in fact as in 
appearance. When considering whether or not the relationship of Judge 
Billings to a member of the corporate firm of Fabian & Clendenin requires 
disqualification under certain statutes and canons of ethical conduct, this 
Court should endeavor to review the appearance of fairness in light of 
circumstances and relationships, as well as in view of hard rules and facts. 
That is the very spirit of due process and fairness in our system. That 
spirit was iterated by this very court: 
Fairness requires not only an absence of actual 
bias, but endeavors to prevent even the possibility 
of unfairness. 
Anderson v. Industrial Com'n of Utah. 6% P.2d 1219 (Utah 1985), at 
1221. 
II 
Judge Billings is charged with responsibility for 
knowing the facts upon which disqualification is 
appropriate. 
In Respondent's reply to the contentions of Appellant that Judge 
Billings should have disqualified herself dated April 13,1990, Respondent 
attempts to lay responsibility upon Mr. Reichert for knowing the 
relationship between Judge Billings and the firm of Fabian & Clendenin. 
However, the only persons who can reasonably be charged with knowledge 
of those relationships which give rise to the issue of disqualification are 
Judge Billings and Mr. Bryce Roe. Nevertheless, Respondent seeks to 
divert the attention of the court from this fact. For example, Respondent at 
page two of the April 13, 1990 brief states "a fact of which this court may 
take notice is that Peter Billings has been associated with Fabian & 
Clendenin for 40 years", as if such fact should be obvious to practicing 
attorneys, or that the fact of relationship by name recognition alone should 
be obvious to other attorneys. Furthermore, Respondent argues that the 
issue of disqualification is not timely, inferring that Appellant should have 
known about the relationship between Judge Billings and members of 
Respondent's firm at some earlier time, laying charge of such knowledge 
upon Appellant. Respondent goes so far as to make a Rule 11 type of 
argument, referring to the parties obligation to make reasonable inquiry 
into facts providing a basis for a cause of action, stating with characteristic 
presumptuousness that "any reasonable inquiry would have informed 
[Appellant's] counsel of the relationship of Judge Billings to employees of 
Fabian & Clendenin." (April 13,1990 Brief at pages 5-6) With respect, 
the learned Mr. Roe forgets that at the commencement of this action he was 
not associated with Fabian & Clendenin and that a reasonable inquiry could 
not have led to knowledge of the facts supporting disqualification, that this 
is Respondent's case and cause of action (as Plaintiff below), and that this 
Rule 11 type of argument has no applicability to the facts at hand. These 
attempts at placing the blame on Mr. Reichert for not having sought 
disqualification of Judge Billings are not consonant with Utah statute and 
canons of judicial conduct. 
In making a determination as to whether or not disqualification of a 
judge is appropriate, the judge must "consider not only the specific 
provisions of the statutes ... but also the Code of Judicial Conduct." Smith 
v. Beckman. 683 P.2d 1214 (Colo.App. 1984), at 1216; see also Stephens 
v. Stephens. 292 S.E.2d 689 (1982). Appellant intends to follow this 
procedure in analyzing the issue of disqualification of Judge Billings as 
framed by this Court. 
Utah statute and the Code of Judicial Conduct (as adopted in Utah) 
combine to make clear the fact that a Judge, and not the parties, must know 
those facts which require disqualification due to familial relationships 
arising from consanguinity or affinity. Section 78-7-l(b), Utah Code 
Annotated, requires that a judge disqualify himself or herself when he or 
she is "related to either party by consanguinity or affinity 1 within the third 
degree, computed according to the rules of common law", (emphasis 
added) Canon 3(C)(1)(d), et seq., Code of Judicial Conduct, requires even 
more factual knowledge of the Judge's potential relationship to a particular 
judicial proceeding, referring to whether or not "the judge or spouse, or a 
person within the third degree of relationship to either or them, of the 
spouse of such a person", (emphasis added) The statutory provisions cited 
require a judge to refrain from participation in a case based upon 
consanguinity or affinity to parties, attorneys, e tc . , within the third 
degree of relationship. The canons of judicial conduct go further, to 
include the spouses of such related persons.2 Since the surnames of such 
persons could vary greatly from that of the judge in question, it would be 
folly to require a party or its counsel to keep an updated and complete list 
of the judge's disqualifying relatives. The person best suited to know the 
nature and extent of such relationships is, of course, the judge. 
Finally, canon 3(D) makes clear the fact that disclosure of facts 
which may give rise to disqualification due to familial relationship rests 
with the judge. That section of the canons of judicial conduct provides: 
^Consanguinity refers to the judge's blood relatives, while affinity usually refers to those persons related to 
the judge's spouse by blood. There are, however, three separate categories of affinity according to Black's 
Law Dictionary: Direct, secondary and collateral. (Blacks 6th edition, 1990, at 59) Direct affinity refers to 
the husbands relationship to die wife's relations by blood, and vice versa. Secondary affinity subsists 
between the husband and his wife's relations by marriage, and vice versa. Collateral affinity subsists 
between die husband and the relations of his wife's relations, and vice versa. The canons and the statute 
cited are not clear as to which categories of affinity are intended. 
2This may lead one to believe that the canons of judicial conduct specify some mixture of direct and 
secondary affinity. 
c 
A judge may, instead of withdrawing from the 
proceeding, disclose on the record or in writing 
the basis of the disqualification. 
The judge has a clear ethical responsibility to disclose potential 
relationships which may require disqualification. Therefore, the Judge 
(not the parties or their counsel) is ethically and statutorily charged with 
knowledge of the facts of relationship with may require disqualification. 
The arguments and contentions of Respondent to the effect that Mr. 
Reichert or his counsel should have known of the disqualifying relationship 
are not founded in law, and cannot be reasonably required in fact. 
Ill 
Under What Circumstances Should a Judge 
Withdraw due to relationship? 
In accordance with the terms of Canons 1,2 and 3, Code of Judicial 
Conduct, a judge whose impartiality might reasonably be questioned must 
enter a disqualification. Canon 1 emphasizes the independence of the 
judiciary as indispensable to justice in our society. Ours is an adversarial 
system, not one of inquisitorial procedure in which the judge takes on the 
role of advocate, and trier of fact and law. In our system, the impartiality 
of a judge is assisted by a certain degree of independence from apparent 
bias and prejudice. Canon 2(B) provides that a judge should not allow 
family relationships to influence judicial conduct of judgment. This canon 
has the subtitle "A Judge Should Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of 
Impropriety in All Activities". The "appearance" of impropriety may arise 
from family relationships in the context of judicial activity, which this 
canon seeks to avoid. This very issue was addressed by the Colorado Court 
of Appeals in Smith, supra. Not only must a judge maintain respect in the 
conduct of court, they must "enhance the respect of the judiciary in the 
eyes of the public." Smith at 1216. Again placing the responsibility for 
securing the respect of the public in the court system upon judges, and not 
upon the parties, the court in Smith states: 
It is of paramount importance that our judges 
meticulously avoid any appearance of partiality, 
not only to secure the confidence of litigants 
before the courts, but to retain public respect. 
Smith at 1216, emphasis added. Canons 1,2 and 3(C) should be read 
together in order to define the "appearance of impropriety" for purposes 
of disqualification. 
Most pertinent to our discussion is Canon 3(C), quoted in part above. 
Canon 3(C) begins with a statement of a general rule regarding mandatory 
disqualification: 
(C) Disqualification. 
(1) Disqualification must be entered in a 
proceeding by any judge whose impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned,... 
This is the statement of the general rule of ethical disqualification. It 
provides for disqualification in circumstances where impartiality might be 
reasonably questioned due to the nature of the proceedings, the subject 
matter involved, or the persons or entities involved, whether directly or 
indirectly, especially those who have any interest in the proceedings, to 
include financial interests. Without limiting the scope of the general rule, 
this canon goes on to provide specific examples of circumstances under 
which disqualification is mandatory since reasonable persons would 
conclude that impartiality can be questioned: 
(C) Disqualification. 
(1) Disqualification must be entered in a 
proceeding by any judge whose impartiality might 
reasonably be questioned, including but not 
limited to instances where: 
* * * 
(d) The judge or spouse, or a person within 
the third degree of relationship to either of them, 
or the spouse of such a person: 
* * * 
(ii) is acting as a lawyer in the proceeding; 
(iii) is known by the judge to have an 
interest that could be substantially affected by the 
outcome of the proceeding; 
Both of the circumstances iterated in subsections (ii) and (iii) are present in 
the case at bar. 
As Respondent was careful to disclose in its brief of April 13,1990, 
Fabian & Clendenin is a Professional Corporation. Fabian & Clendenin 
clearly acts as lawyer in these proceedings. To confirm this fact, one need 
only read the cover page of that brief, stating "Bryce E. Roe, Esq. ... 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN... Attorneys for Respondent". Furthermore, the 
Smith case states clearly that a partner in a firm is engaged or is acting in a 
case for the purposes of Canon 3 primarily because he has a financial 
interest in the outcome of the case. Since Fabian & Clendenin is a 
corporation, Mr. Roe was acting in the course of representing Regional 
Sales, probably as an agent, shareholder, director or officer or the 
corporation of Fabian & Clendenin. That corporation, as attorney 
representing Regional Sales, had member persons who were related within 
the third degree of affinity to Judge Billings, namely Peter W. Billings, Sr. 
and Peter W. Billings, Jr., who are no doubt agents, shareholders, officers 
or directors of that corporation. Therefore, the whole corporate firm falls 
under the requirements of mandatory disqualification, as a related attorney 
in an offending degree of relationship to Judge Billings. Of course, all 
facts underlying the exact relationship between Peter W. Billings Sr and 
Peter W. Billings Jr. is in the control of Fabian & Clendenin. Appellant is 
at a decided disadvantage in proving this relationship and can only make 
relevant allegations at this point. 
The issue of awarding attorney's fees to Fabian & Clendenin requires 
disqualification under subsection (iii), since it has an interest^ in the 
outcome of the proceedings. In the case of Sadbury v. Wilson. 441 P.2d 
381 (Okla., 1968), the court held that a judge should have disqualified 
himself where he would have been called upon to decide the issue of 
attorney's fees following the termination of another stage of litigation. The 
verdict reached at trial was upheld by the Court of Appeals in an opinion 
authored by Judge Billings, in which Regional Sales prevailed upon the 
merits and the terms of the contract(s) in question. This entitled the firm 
to receipt of attorney's fees under that contract, a direct interest in the 
outcome of the litigation. Other additional interests include the prestige of 
the firm for having won the case, and the potential for additional work and 
revenue from Regional Sales or persons whom it refers to Fabian & 
Clendenin based upon the successful outcome of the case. Fabian & 
Clendenin has a direct and substantial interest in the outcome of this case, 
and therefore, Judge Billings should have disqualified herself from the 
proceedings, or should have disclosed the facts underlying disqualification 
to the parties, and allowed the parties to waive disqualification if they so 
desired pursuant to canon 3(D). 
3Note that the canon does not state a 'substantial" interest, or a "pecuniary" interest. Furthermore, the 
Canon does have sections which clearly state "financial interest", and that term is defined within the canon. 
IV 
Judge Billing's Past History of Voluntary 
Disqualification in cases in which a lawyer-
relative is affiliated Underscores her Appreciation 
of Avoiding even the Appearance of Partiality. 
Judge Billings has a history of disqualifying herself from 
proceedings involving a law firm with which a lawyer-relative is affiliated. 
She, of all people, can best appreciate her own ability to deal impartially 
with cases involving Fabian & Clendenin. Appellant can offer no 
explanation for why she did not disqualify herself in this case. Appellant 
does not allege that the failure to disqualify was intentional or malicious. 
Nevertheless, presumably knowing the ethical requirements contained in 
statute and canons of conduct, she has repeatedly disqualified herself. Her 
subjective understanding of the potential for partiality (or the appearance 
of it) involving representation by Fabian & Clendenin far surpasses the 
requirements of any objective standard established in the Code of Judicial 
Conduct. She is the best judge of her own limitations and of her own 
ethical conduct, and has historically elected to take the wise course of 
disqualification in such cases. This court should take her own past conduct 
as the measure of relief prayed for by Appellant. In answering the issue as 
framed by the court, Appellant concludes that Judge Billings should have 
disqualified herself, or should have made the facts of disqualification 
known to the parties, allowing the the parties to waive it if they so elected. 
In the event that the parties did not elect to waive disqualification, then it 
became mandatory. 
11 
CONCLUSION 
The relationship of Judge Billings to members of the Firm of Fabian 
& Clendenin required her disqualification as a judge hearing the appeal at 
bar. Judge Billings is charged with knowing the familial relationships 
which could trigger disqualification under the Utah Code section quoted 
above, and the canons of judicial conduct cited. Having heard the case, and 
having ruled directly against Appellant Mr. Reichert on virtually every 
point in his favor, and having ruled positively on those points raised on 
appeal that were favorable to Regional Sales, the "appearance" of 
impropriety on her part is indeed very real. Due to her past history of 
disqualification, it would appear that Judge Billings is aware of her ethical 
and statutory duties in this regard. Her relationship to Peter W. Billings, 
Sr., and Peter W. Billings, Jr., who are apparently officers, shareholders 
directors of agents of the firm of Fabian & Clendenin and who are within 
the third degree of affinity, requires disqualification since that corporate 
firm has an interest in the outcome of the litigation as do the persons to 
whom she is related. The failure of Judge Billings to disqualify herself 
from the case renders the opinion of the Court of Appeals void, not merely 
voidable. (See Hoff v. Eighth Judicial District Court. 378 P.2d 977 
(Nevada 1963)) This Court should therefore hold that the opinion of the 
Court of Appeals is void, and grant the relief prayed for by Appellant in its 
brief (i.e., leave the verdict and award of attorney's fees undisturbed; or 
reverse if in fact there was prejudicial error and remand to the trial court 
allowing Appellant his day in court on equal footing with Respondent). 
Respectfully submitted this_Z_ day of yy\ (%AA&I . 1991. 
IRAIMRFANKHAUSER 
DAVID D. PECK 
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